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ABSTRACT 
This Working Paper examines a body of research addressed to 
critical issues in the field of status characteristics and social 
interaction. The main objective is to assess the extent to which 
various findings reported in the literature are compatible with a 
formalized theory presented by Berger et al. (1977), and with 
variants of that theory. An initial and unexpected discovery is 
that some widely cited results reported by Freese and Cohen 
(1973), long believed to contradict the "combining" assumption of 
the Berger et al. model, are in fact very well described by that 
model -- and thus by its defining assumptions. A body of 
research guided by relatively recent theoretical extensions of 
the Freese-Cohen work is then examined; and it is found that this 
research is at least as compatible with the Berger et al. model 
as with the alternative (variant) models. These conclusions, in 
some cases, contradict the conclusions of the original authors. 
The methodological bases of the conflicting assessments of 
evidence are examined in detail. Everything considered, there 
can be little doubt that the Berger et al. version of the theory 
of status characteristics and social interaction rates higher 
than its alternatives on empirical adequacy, and that it also is 
superior on such criteria as scope and fruitfulness. 

INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this Working Paper is to provide a detailed 
account of my efforts to assess variants of the theory of status 
characteristics and social interaction. Among researchers in 
this field of sociology, there exist differences of opinion on 
the worth of certain early and contemporary wo1·l{s, and these 
differences of opinion are by no means random. They are most 
clearly understood, I think, as consequences of what Wagner and 
Berger called theoretical variation (1985, pp. 721-22). What is 
meant by this? Suppose that some theory -- call it Tl -- is 
generally accepted by the members of a research community. Tl is 
regarded as very promising, but it is also quite limited in 
scope. As work continues and the validity of Tl becomes well 
established, an extension having greater scope is proposed and 
wins adherents. But these adherents do !!.()t include the entire 
community. An alternative extension, more appeAling to the 
remainder, is proposed within essentially the sAme time frame. 
So then there exist two "extended theories," T?., ;cmd T2,, which 
share basic concepts and assumptions due to tlw:i. r common ancestry 
in Tl, but which nonetheless differ in importa11t respects. 
What is likely to be the impact of this division upon the 
cumulative development of the field? We can imAgine alternative 
scenarios. Perhaps the competition between the proponents of T2 0 
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and T2 8 generates a flurry of research activity. which culminates 
in a resolution of the points at issue. In tl1i.s case, T2~ atld 
T2. would no doubt continue to have their staunch supporters; but 
the field as a whole would tend in the direction of a more 
unified theory. Alternatively, perhaps each gJ:oup simply goes 
its own way. In this latter case, further extPJlRions of T2. and 
T2 8 would almost certainly follow, and the iss110s separating the 
two groups would almost certainly become increasingly convoluted 
and obscure. 
To say that the second scenario describes the last decade of 
status characteristics research would be an exaggeration; yet 
even the most casual perusal of the literature suggests the need 
for researchers in this field to resolve certain }Jasic issues. 
As things now stand, even the most brilliant tl1eoretical 
achievement would be rejected by some portion nf the community, 
because it would be seen as built upon discredltc,d premises. The 
objective of this paper, then, is to contd.butr> towards a 
resolution of disagreements that divided the sl.atus 
characteristics research community fifteen years ago, and that 
continue to divide it today. 
STATUS CHARACTERISTICS THEORY 
The Common Ground 
The theory of status characteristics and social interaction 
was proposed by Joseph Berger, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris 
Zelditch, Jr. (1966, 1972). The theory posits that the actors in 
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a social situation attend to one anothers' attributes, form 
cognitive expectations for themselves and others on the basis of 
those attributes, and conduct themselves as guided by their 
cognitive expectations. These processes do not ordinarily occur 
at a high level of awareness, and very seldom involve deliberate 
calculation. As the members of a group act and rPact to each 
other, new features of the group itself emerge. In situations 
that are primarily task-focused, one of these emergent features 
is a power-arid-prestige order, which, once formed, serves to 
condition subsequent interactions (Bales 1953; Berger 1958; 
Berger and Conner 1969; Skvoretz 1981). 
The culturally defined characteristics of individuals often 
though not always -- correspond to the strata of the society 
of which those individuals are members. Status characteristics 
theory clearly has linkages to the study of socinl 
stratification, particularly to approaches that !'<'Cognize the 
multidimensional nature of social stratificatir>ll (see, for 
instance, Weber 1922; Benoit-Srnullyan 1944; Huqlues 1945; Lenski 
1954; Zelditch and Anderson 1966; Geschwender lqG7). 
Two operative assumptions distinguish the s1:nlLIS 
characteristics perspective from most other soc.i.al interactionist 
perspectives: ( 1) the rnetatheoretical premise tl1at such 
processes exhibit _stati_E_t:.i.C:<ll _t:e_gul_ari_I:XE!_S des<:1·.i b<~ble by formal 
sets of hypotheses; and (2) the substantive premise that a 
person's perceptions and actions are mediated l>y cog11itive 
expectation _states having a distinctive strucb1re ( cf. Berger et 
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al. 1985). Individuals" perceptions (conscious or otherwise) 
guide their behaviors; their behaviors in tu1·n [~~d back upon 
their perceptions. Mediating these reciprocal rl~p~ndencies are 
processes amenable to scientific study. Such processes are 
usually analyzed in terms of the formation of cxpecti!ti()_rl §t~_j:es, 
the central concept of all variants of the theory. 
The Differences 
As suggested above, all status characteristics researchers 
trace the roots of their work to the original ••crslon of the 
theory, described above (Berger, Cohen, and ~elditch 1966, 1972). 
While this first version was rigorously developed, it was quite 
limited in scope, applying only to a single pair of interacting 
individuals differentiated by a single status cl1aracteristic (Air 
Force rank, age, or the like). A further limitation was that, 
while the theory could generate testable hypotheses, these took 
the form of rank-order predictions, as opposed tn specific 
numerical (metric) predictions. Because of its very limited 
scope, the theory's earliest tests were almost always laboratory 
experiments, where information and its communic~Uon could be 
carefully controlled. 
Evidence supporting this earliest version of the theory 
quickly accumulated. Soon additional, more complicAted questions 
became feasible to investigate. Extensions of the original 
theory were proposed to answer the new questions. Most notable 
were an extension by Freese and Cohen (1973), and one by Berger 
and Fisek (1974). Both generalized the theory to two actors 
differentiated by one _9r !)!Ore status characteristics. The most 
novel feature of each extension was its conception of how statl!.~ 
inconsistency is resolved. (How the two conceptions differ will 
be described below.) Although the hypotheses entailed by the 
respective theoretical variants clearly were at odds with one 
another, both extensions received what their adherents took to be 
empirical confirmation, which often was interpreted as 
disconfirmation of the other variant. 
A third extension was proposed a few years later. This 
subsequent version, which set forth a provocative array of new 
ideas, was reported in a book by Joseph Berger, M. Hamit Fisek, 
Robert Z. Norman, and Morris Zelditch, Jr., published in 1977. 
(For ease of expression, this version hereafter will be referred 
to as the BFNZ formulation). In this extension, it became 
possible to study social situations involving multiple actors, 
each with multiple status characteristics, and Lo generate 
precise (parametric) predictions about certain aspects of 
behavior. In terms of scope, mathematical elegance, parsimony, 
and potential fruitfulness, this newest formulntio11 was a quantum 
improvement over its predecessors. 
Finally, in the thirteen years since the BFNZ formulation 
was published, there have appeared numerous papers that propose 
additional formulations, and/or that report empirical research 
designed to test such formulations. As the primary point of 
departure, the BFNZ formulation has played a central part in 
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these investigations. The confirmationjdisconfinnation standing 
of the latter is thus of considerable importance; but it seems to 
be in some doubt. 
The earliest tests of the BFNZ formulation provided 
encouraging support for its essential correctness (see Webster 
and Driskell 1978; Fox and Moore 1979; Zelditc!1 et al. 1980). 
Much of the subsequent research, however, has been less 
encouraging (see Martin and Sell 1980 1985; Hembroff .E'!.t .~Jo. 1981; 
Hembroff 1982; Greenstein and Knottnerus 1980; C\nd Knottnerus and 
Greenstein 1981). Berger (1988) cited these latter 
investigations and applauded their efforts to ~lnrify important 
theoretical issues. But he added: ''Not all of these studies 
report results that are in full accord with the [BFNZ 
formulation], and an overall assessment of [this body of] theory-
testing research is a worthwhile task for the future" (1988, p. 
456). 
What is striking about findings concernin<J the BFNZ 
formulation, both those that support it and those tltat question 
its value, is the extent to which they are pathorned by the 
theoretical variant to which the authors reporL.ing those findings 
subscribe. Almost without exception, the _critical stuq;le_,; have 
roots in the Freese-Cohen variant (especially as elaborated by 
Freese 1974, 1976); the supportive studies have roots in the 
Berger-Fisek variant.' While the ostensible focus has been upon 
the BFNZ formulation and alternatives to it, I have become 
increasingly convinced that the issues of real concern are long 
7 
unresolved issues that antedate the BFNZ formulation. 
Interpretations of Freese and Cohen·s (1973) results appear 
to be at the root of many of the disagreements among status 
characteristics researchers. It therefore seems appropriate to 
begin my investigation with a more detailed examination of these 
important results. 
THE FREESE AND COHEN STUDY 
The research by Freese and Cohen (1973) demonstrated in a 
laboratory setting that the interaction disabilities associated 
with low ascribed status can be largely eliminated under certain 
specified conditions, a conclusion whose importance for efforts 
to ameliorate racial, sexual, and age discrimination would be 
difficult to overstate. A related study by Cohen and Roper 
(1972), carried out in an applied setting, addressed the same 
problem and obtained essentially the same resull:s. Taken 
together, these two studies constitute a significa11t advance in 
sociological knowledge. This contribution is not at issue. The 
question I wish to address is: Do Freese and Cohen's results 
demonstrate a fundamental inadequacy in the RE"f.!Z formulation? 
In the analysis carried out by Freese and Col1e11, the 
dependent variable was a measure of power-and-pJ.·estige behavior 
denoted P(S), which stands for the probabiUty of a stay-
response, operationalized as the Pt:()P_OJ.:j:j_()n of cd:Ay-responses in 
a set of trials. A stay-response is a response in which the 
focal actor !"._~ists_ an influence attempt by a e<econd actor, 
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rather than being influenced. 
The situation in which these responses take pl.i1ce is 
abstractly defined by the following assumption": (1) two actors, 
p and o, are working together on a task, both motivnted to seek a 
successful outcome; and (2) both actors consider it legitimate 
and necessary to take each other's judgments iJJto account. 
In terms of the BFNZ formulation, P(S) is a function of the 
focal actor's "expectation advantage" over the other actor. (By 
convention, p is the focal actor and o is the o.ther person.) The 
BFNZ treatise uses the notation, e 0 - e., to de11nte the focal 
actor· s expectation advantage. The function p1·oposed is: P(S) 
= m + q (e e ) p - 0 • In this expression, m and q are parameters to 
be estimated from the research data. An actor's expectation 
advantage, which may be positive or negative (that is, it may be 
an advantage or a disadvantage), is calculated from a study's 
independent variables in accordance with the s~t of hypotheses 
that constitutes the heart of the BFNZ treatis~. Illustrative 
calculations are provided in Appendix A of this paper. 
In the Freese-Cohen study, the independent: vad ab_l<>.:c; were: 
(1) a diffuse status characteristic; and (2) a pi1i.r of 
consistently assigned specific status characte1·lstics. Detailed 
discussions of the these variables and their maJ1ipt1lation in the 
research are given by the authors (Freese and Cohen 1973, pp. 
186-90). In the presentations to follow, I shall identify 
experimental conditions by ordered pairs of pare11lhesized 
indications of p"s and o"s r~J'!t::iv~ status on the independent 
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variables. For instance, (H-L)(LL-HH) describes the experimental 
condition in which p has high diffuse status, o low diffuse 
status -- the (H-L) portion -- and in which p has low status on 
the two specific characteristics, o having high status -- the 
(LL-HH) portion. 
I have fitted the BFNZ model to Freese and Cohen's data.' 
The results are summarized in Table 1.' 
Table 1 about here 
As Table 1 shows, the correspondence between the observed 
and predicted P(S) values is exceptionally close. A chi-squared 
goodness-of-fit test, which assesses the discrepancies between 
the observed and predicted values, yields a computed value of 
1.217. For a chi-squared test with four degrees of freedom, a 
computed value of at least 9.488 is required to reject the model 
at the .05 level of significance. In this caf:e, the observed and 
predicted values are very close for each experimental condition.' 
Those who have concluded that Freese and Cohen's data are 
inconsistent with the BFNZ formulation have basRd that conclusion 
on a comparison of the observed P(S) values of Conditions 3 and 
6, and a comparison of those of Conditions 4 and 5. To be sure, 
the pairs of observed P(S) values, in botl1 comparisons, are very 
close. This has suggested to some analysts th<1t the subjects in 
the ''status inconsistency'' conditions (those in which the 
cognitive expectations that would derive from status alone 
conflict with those that would derive from ability alone) i_gnored 
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the diffuse status characteristic. More abstractly, the claim is 
that the subjects employed a "balancing" principle, a mode of 
information processing in which the focal actor eliminates 
cognitive inconsistency (or cognitive imbalance) by disregarding 
information that does not fit in with the predominant pattern. 
As noted above, the BFNZ formulation posits a "combining" 
principle, a mode of information processing in which the focal 
actor aggregates all status and performance information in 
accordance with postulates of the theory (see Berger ~t al. 1977, 
Chapter 4). 
It is instructive to fit and test an explicit model that has 
the balancing assumption built into it. Constructing such a 
model is straightforward. This involves nothing more than 
eliminationg links from the model that correspond to the elements 
purportedly eliminated by the focal actor, in accordance with 
criteria explicated by Freese and Cohen (1973, pp. 181-86). The 
most pertinent results are summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2 about here 
Consistent with Freese and Cohen's conclusions, a balancing model 
does fit the data (X'= 4.615, df = 4, P = .3291). We cannot 
reject the balancing hypothesis on the basis of these data; but 
considering these results together with those of Table 1, it is 
clear that the Freese-Cohen data do not provide a strong basis 
for choosing between the ''combining'' and ''balancing" hypotheses. 
This observation in no way reduces sub,;;tantive_ importance of this 
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research, which, in my estimation, is considerable. The point is 
simply that the Freese and Cohen study does not demonstrate the 
superiority of either a combining or a balancing assumption. Its 
results are consistent with either. Contrary to numerous 
statements in the literature, its results are very consistent 
with the implications of the BFNZ formulation. 
While Freese and Cohen"s research cannot resolve the 
question of whether people "balance" or "combine" status 
information, the issue nonetheless does seem resolvable. It is 
one of two outstanding concerns about which the existing evidence 
would seem to warrant rather firm conclusions. I shall now 
address these two problems, both of which involve the salience or 
non-salience of social information under specifiable conditions. 
TWO PERSISTENT ISSUES: WHERE DO WE STAND? 
Combining vs. Balancing 
Suppose p is high on characteristic C, and low on 
characteristic c, whereas o is low on C, and high on C,. Does 
this status inconsistency produce cognitive dissonance for p and 
o? And if so, how is that dissonance resolved as p and o strive 
to form cognitive expectations for themselves and each other? 
Status inconsistency can be given an asymmetrical character 
by assuming a third characteristic c, that reinforces c,. Other 
elaborations are possible as well. Whatever the precise 
configuration, the essential theoretical question is: How do 
people process discrepant status information in assessing each 
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other's probable abilities to contribute to a shnred task? 
The results of those few experiments that do address this 
problem -- notably, Webster and Driskell 1978; and Zelditch et 
al. 1980 -- largely support the combining principle. When the 
combining model is fitted to Webster and Driskell's data, we find 
the fit to be exceptionally good (X 2 = 0.261, df = 1, P = .6095). 
In contrast, when the balancing model is fitted, we find the fit 
to be inadequate (X 2 = 4.754, df = 1, p < .OS). Further details 
are given in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3 about here 
Table 4 about here 
Similarly, when the combining model is fitted to Zelditch et 
al. "s data, we find the fit to be excellent (X" = 1.498, df = 4, 
P = .8270); but when the balang_i_ng is fitted, we find the fit to 
be, at best, marginal (X 2 = 8.549, df = 4, P < .10). 4 A fuller 
description of these results is given in Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 5 about here 
Table 6 about here 
As far as I can determine, there exists no published data 
that support the balancing principle more strongly than the 
combining principle. In social situations that are_ _?_t_rong_ly 
task-oriented, it seems likely that people take into acount all 
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indications of "likely task ability," including those that 
represent cultural and/or personal prejudices. The latter is 
unfortunate, and no one could condone the unfairness i. t sometimes 
produces for individuals; but the evidence suggests it is true. 
To the degree that criticisms of the BFNZ formulation have been 
motivated by the belief that a sizable body of existing evidence 
requires a balancing model, those criticisms evidently have been 
motivated by a misconception. 
Differentiating vs. Equating Ch~>._t:_a_cteristi_Cl3 
How do people deal with status information that <=_quates_ 
them? Suppose p and o both are high (or low, or average) on 
characteristic c,. Is C1 salient in such a case? Is equating 
information taken into account at all, or is it simply ignored? 
There are numerous inconsistencies in the status characteristics 
literature on this point (compare, for instance, Berger ~t 9_1_. 
1980 with Martin and Sell 1985). 
It is well established that a characteristic cl_i_ff~.t:_el}ti_il_ting 
actors becomes salient -- unless, that is, it is explicitly 
gJssociated from success or failure at the group"s task, either 
by cultural prescriptions or by clear indicati.ons within the 
situation itself. (For a discussion of this principle, known as 
the "burden-of-proof principle," see Berger _e_t: _al. 1977: 108-113; 
or Webster and Driskell 1985: 112-116.) In the case of a 
characteristic equating actors, the most compelling hypothesis is 
that it becomes salient only j,_i it is explicitly _O\_S}3()<:_Lated with 
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success or failure at the group's task, either by cultural 
prescriptions or by clear indications within th" situation 
itself. Stated another way, the burden of proof is upon task-
relevance for an equating characteristic, upon task-irrelevance 
for a differentiating characteristic. 
Excluding the critical literature (for the time being), the 
two studies most pertinent to the 'issue of equating 
characteristics are the study by Berger ~:t: i>J.. ( 1970) and that by 
vlebster ( 1977) . In the Berger et al. study, subjects were tested 
on two abilities, both of which, they were told, were correlated 
with ability at the task they would be performing later in the 
experiment. There were five experimental conditions, which can 
be signified by the notations (HH-LL), (HH-HL), (HL-LH), (LL-LH), 
and (LL-HH). In the first condition, the focal actor was high on 
both abilities (thus, HH), the other actor low on both (thus, 
LL). In the second condition, the focal actor WC\S high on both, 
the other actor high on the first and low on the second; and so 
on. Notice that Conditions 2 and 4 operationalize egtt_<;~ting 
characteri sties. Moreover, those equating chan1cteri sties are 
abilities explicitly associated with success at the group's task. 
When the BFNZ formulation with sali__§!!_C_~ assumed is fitted to 
the experimental data, the fit is found to be very good (X' = 
3.412, df = 3, P = .3325). When the BFNZ formulation '<lith 
salience not assumed is fitted to the data, the fit is found to 
be considerably worse (X' = 8.115, df = 3, P = .0438). Under the 
first hypothesis, the model is retained; under the second, it 
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must be rejected at the .05 level of significance. Once again, a 
fuller summary is given in the accompanying tables. 
Table 7 about here 
Table 8 about here 
In the Webster (1977) research, the subjects were tested on 
three abilities, one being the task ability itself, the remaining 
two being talents neither associated with, nor dissociated from, 
success at the task. In two experimental conditions, subjects 
were equated at an average level on the two abilities of 
unspecified task-relevance; in two others, sujects were equated 
at a high level on these two abilities; and in four other 
conditions--control groups--subjects were given no feedback on 
their levels !!>h the abilities of unspecified task-relevance, 
although they did take the tests. In all._ conditions, the 
subjects were given feedback on their levels of the task ability. 
Notice that these manipulations were similar to those of Berger 
et al. (1970), except that Berger ~t al. stated to their subjects 
explicitly that the equating characteristic was known to be 
associated with performance at the upcoming task, whereas Webster 
left the task-relevance of the equating characteristics 
unspecified. This was the oJ1J~y important difference. 
When the BFNZ formulation wt:t:.l:! §a_l_t._"'_r!S::~ assumed is fitted to 
the data, the fit is very marginal (X' = 9.291, df = 4, P = 
.0542). When the BFNZ formulation with .l'li!.loi_~nce not _<ll'lsumed is 
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fitted to the same data, the fit is much improved (X' = 3.799, df 
= 4, P = .4339).' More complete summaries are given in Tables 9 
and 10 below. 
Table 9 about here 
Table 10 about here 
Taken together, the Berger et al. (1970) and Webster (1977) 
studies clearly support the hypothesis that. for an equating 
characteristic, the burden of proof (unlike for a differentiating 
characteristic) is upon that characteristic's reley§_nc~ to the 
group's task. An equating characterisitic becomes salient only 
if it is explicitly associated with success or failure at the job 
to be accomplished. 
As we will see very shortly, the two questions we have been 
considering in this section are central to an i11terpretation of 
the critical literature. I now wish to consider a major subset 
of that literature, which consists of the variotls papers by 
Hembroff, Martin, and Sell (1980, 1981, 1982). As suggested 
earlier, their research and theorizing is perhRps best seen as a 
further extension of the Freese-Cohen variant of the status 
characteristics research program, which differs .i.n some respects 
from that branch of the program guided explicitly by the Berger-
Fisek variant. These authors invariably use the BFNZ formulation 
as their alternative for comparison. For lack of an agreed upon 
designation, I shall refer to their set of interrelated research 
17 
endeavors as the HMS research program. 
THE HMS RESEARCH PROGRAM 
An Extension of the Freese-Cohen Theo~ 
Hembroff et al. 's theory postulates that an actor's 
''expectation state value'' (ESV) for self vis-a-vis other (another 
actor) is a weighted average of that actor's ar,sessments of their 
comparative diffuse status and performance characteristics. As 
in the BFNZ formulation, a diffuse status characteristic is a 
characteristic such as race, gender, or age, a characteristic 
with many culturally prescribed correlates. A performance 
characteristic, however, is a non-unitary set of what the BFNZ 
theory calls specific status characteristics. Two or more 
related abilities constitute a performance characteristic. The 
"cognitive weights" given to these characteristics, according to 
the theory, depend upon the consistency of the evaluations of the 
elements that make up each subset of status information. 
For a diffuse status characteristic, the elements are the 
stereotypes associated with it in the actor's ct1lture. Some of 
those elements may be positively evaluated; othc,rr, may be 
negatively evaluated. Evaluations, moreover, may be contingent 
upon the group's task. Typically, the stereotypes associated 
with a diffuse status characteristic (for example, race) are not 
perfectly consistent among themselves: the _c;_on_sis:t:E!ncy or 
''strength'' of a diffuse status characteristic is practically 
always less than the hypothetical maximum. 
18 
For a performance characteristic, the elements are the 
subtraits that comprise it. If _i'>tbleti_c: "'b_iJity were the 
performance characteristic in question, such subtraits as speed, 
agility, strength, stamina, and eye-hand coordinatio11 would 
(perhaps) comprise a reasonable list of its elements. For two 
individuals, p and o, if p were clearly faster, more agile, 
stronger, more indefatigueable, and better coordinated than o, 
then, for a situation involving the two of them, athletic ability 
would be a very strong performance characteristic, because it 
would differentiate p and o in several related ways, and the 
evaluative orderings would be perfectly consiste11t. According to 
the theory, the more consistent the orderings, the stronger the 
characteristic in determining the cognitive expectations of the 
actors in a social situation. 
With this brief description of the theoretical portion of 
the program, let us now consider the HMS experiment. 
The Experiment 
Ten of the authors· experimental conditio11s were reported in 
the paper, ''Resolving Status Inconsistency," by L. A. Hembroff. 
Two of the same conditions, plus three others, plus two from 
another experiment were reported in the paper, "Total Performance 
Inconsistency,'' by L. A. Hembroff, M. W. Martin, and J. Sell. 
And a third set of conditions, including two nPW ones, was 
reported in the paper, "The Marginal Utility of Information," by 
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M. W. Martin and J. Sell. All told, there were fifteen separate 
conditions that are comparable to one another. 
The experiment entailed manipulations of two kinds of status 
information: (1) a diffuse status characteristic; and (2) a 
performance characteristic. The first was relative age. All the 
subjects in the experiment were female college students 17-21 
years of age; the age manipulation was a manipulation of the age 
of the subject's partne~, who was an accomplice of the 
experimenter. Each subject was introduced to her partner through 
a television monitor. (The subjects were told that their 
partners were in an adjacent experimental room.) To induce the 
naive subject into a "high" state of the relative-age 
characteristic, she was introduced to a partner who was an 11-
year-old girl. During the introductions, this partner stated, in 
response to a question from the experimenter, that she liked "to 
play with dolls ... and ... with my brother's electric train" 
(Hembroff 1978, p. 112). To induce the subject into a "low" 
state, she was introduced to a 38-year-old woman, who stated that 
she liked to attend movies and listen to music. The second kind 
of status information manipulated--the "performance" 
characteristic- -was a fictitious talent refern~d to as "Contrast 
Sensitivity," described as'' ... the ability to determine 
continuities and discontinuities between unfami.li ar symbols or 
patterns'' (Hembroff 1978, p. 109). The subjects were told that 
Contrast Sensitivity is a single ability consisting of multiple 
subtraits which are best measured by separate tests. Each 
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subject (except those in the status-only conditions) was given 
three to five paper-and-pencil tests, each test purportedly a 
measure of her level of ability on a subtrait of Contrast 
Sensitivity. When the tests were completed and (purportedly) 
scored, the subject was told that she achieved a very high, or a 
very low, score on each test, the particular pattern of highs and 
lows depending upon the experimental condition. For instance, in 
one of the conditions, the subject was informed that she achieved 
three very high scores and one very low score. By design, her 
partner appeared to have achieved the reverse pattern. That is 
to say, the naive subject (purportedly) got the results, H-L-H-H, 
on four tests; her fictitious partner was portrayed as having 
gotten the results, L-H-L-L, on the respective tests. Hembroff 
et al. created their fifteen experimental conditions by crossing 
seven different "performance'' levels (including that of no 
information) with three different levels of the relative-age 
variable (high, low, and no information), omitting the six 
possible combinations that seemed least interesting. 
Fit of the Variant Model 
Does the Hembroff et al_. theory accord with the pre-existing 
data that inspired it? Does it fit the new data collected to 
test it? Let us investigate the first question briefly, the· 
second in more detail. 
Hembroff (1978, p. 39; 1982, p. 188) presented a formula for 
computing an actor's expectation state value.• I have used this 
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formula to compute the ESV associated with each of the six 
experimental conditions of Freese and Cohen's study, Nowhere do 
Hembroff, Martin, or Sell specify precisely how an ESV is 
supposed to be related to observable behavior; but Hembroff did 
assert that P(S) values" ,, . are assumed to be a monotonic 
function of ESVs ... " (Hembroff 1982, p. 193). For lack of more 
precise guidance, I have assumed that this montonic function, 
whatever its exact form, can be approximated by the linear form: 
P(S) = m + q ESV. I have fitted this model to Freese and 
Cohen's data. The results are summarized in Table 9. (It should 
be noted that alternative functional forms, such as the logit or 
probit form, make almost no difference in the predicted values or 
in the chi-squared goodness-of-fit results.) 
Table 11 about here 
As Table 11 shows, the fit of the model to the data is acceptable 
(X'= 6.763, df = 4, P = .1490). While the fit is acceptable, a 
comparison of these results with those reported in Tables 1 and 2 
shows that, for these data, the HMS formulation is not an 
improvement over the BFNZ formulation. 
Consider now the results from the HMS experiment itself. 
I computed the values of the ESV variable for each of Hembroff 
et .!!l· 's fifteen experimental conditions, and ngain fitted the 
model. The results are given in Table 12. 
Table 12 about here 
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As the chi-squared goodness-of-fit test shows, the model does not 
fit the data particularly well. The discrepancies between the 
observed and predicted P(S) values cannot reasonabli be 
attributed to chance alone (X 2 = 29.432, df = 13, P < .01). 
If we consider only the ten experimental conditions reported 
by Hembroff (1982), our conclusion remains essentially the same. 
We find the fit of the model to the data to be inadequate (X 2 = 
16.647, df = 8, p = .0340). 
Hembroff et al. 's conclusions differ from these. Hembroff 
stated that " general support for the set of predictions is 
concluded. Since [the) deviations are easily accounted for by 
random error, a high degree of consistency between the model and 
the observed outcomes is concluded" (Hembroff 1978, p. 92). This 
general assessment is echoed in Hembroff et ~ . .!.· · s other papers as 
well (see, for example, Hembroff, Martin, and Sell 1981, p. 429; 
Hembroff 1982, pp. 198-201; and Martin and Sell 1985, p. 181). 
This assessment rests upon two kinds of observ8tions: (1) 
comparisons of predicted rank-orderings among triple~ of P(S) 
values; and (2) results from a statistical test proposed by Sell 
and Freese (1977, 1984). Many of the unresolved issues in the 
theory of status characteristics and social inte1·action stem from 
different researchers looking at the same evidence and drawing 
different conclusions. In the following two sections, I shall 
examine the statistical procedures used by Hemln·off et al. My 
objective is to shed some light on why those procedures lead to 
conclusions so very different from the conclusions suggested by 
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the results from fitting and testing explicit parametric models. 
Tests of Ordinal hypotheses 
It will be helpful to proceed in terms of a concrete 
example. Hembroff (1982) based his conclusions, in part, on 
tests of four pairs of ordinal hypotheses. One of these was the 
following: 
Hypothesis la: P(S), = P(S) 2 > P(S), 
In this statement, the subscripts of P(S) refer to the 
experimental conditions as listed in Table 4, numbet·ed from top 
to bottom. 
The actual (parametric) predictions of the Hembroff 
formulation for these three experimental conditions are .6690, 
.6485, and .5769, respectively (see Table 4). Thus, the= of the 
first relation, strictly speaking, is >. Hembroff reasoned that 
the predictions are so close that = is the more appropriate 
description. 
Hembroff evaluated this hypthesis by carryjng out a pair of 
t tests, the first comparing the mean numbers of stay-responses 
per subject for Conditions 1 and 2, the second comparing the 
means for Conditions 2 and 3. From the first test, he found the 
difference of means not significant (t = 0.214, elf = 48, P > 
.SO). From the second, he found the difference significant (t 
3.217, df = 48, p < .01). Since these t test results are 
consistent with the hypothesis, he reported support for his 
model. 
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Hembroff also tested a counterpart to this hypothesis, the 
prediction of the BFNZ model: 
Hypothesis lb: P(S), > P(S), > P(S), 
Notice that > replaces = in the first relation. 
The actual (parametric) predictions of the BFNZ model are 
.6691, .6407, and .5827, respectively. These actual predictions 
are all very close to the actual predictions of the Hembroff 
model. Nevertheless, the results from the t tests, while they 
support Hypothesis la, do not support Hypothesis lb. 
A question that arises is: At what point can = legitimately 
replace > in the statistical hypothesis? As our concrete example 
illustrates, this decision has very important consequences for 
the interpretations of the results of the subsequent t tests. If 
> is taken to be the theoretical prediction, then rejecting the t 
test's null hypothesis supports the theory; but if = is the 
theoretical prediction, then fail_i_n_g: to reject the null 
hypothesis supports the theory. What is to prevent the analyst 
from conducting the t test first, and then deciding whether to 
make > or = the theoretical prediction? 
Hembroff seems to suggest that the methodology of ordinal 
comparisons is uniquely well suited for choosing between 
competing formulations. His use of that methodology, however, 
involves too many arbitrary decisions; and it ignores the 
requirement that a decision rule for choosing among hypotheses be 
grounded in a defensible conception of chance variations.• 
The use of an ordinal methodology seems in many ways a 
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throwback to an earlier period in which status characteristics 
theory permitted only ordinal comparisons. In my judgment, the 
advantages of explicit models and a methodology appropriate to 
them are enormous. 
The Sell-Freese Statistical Test 
The most cryptic support for Hembroff et al. 's formulations 
has been generated by a statistical procedure proposed by Sell 
and Freese (1977, 1984). Inexplicably, the validity of this 
procedure -- and of the findings it has generated has never 
been questioned. Does this decision tool in fact adequately 
address issues of status characteristics theory? 
Most status characteristics experiments have entailed 
subjects making sequences of decisions, which are recorded as 
stay-responses or change-responses. The researc!1er typically has 
not bHen concerned about the precise response sequences. If the 
experimental protocol entails T trials, all sequences that result 
in K stay-responses and T - K change-responses are considered 
equivalent. But it is possible to distinguish among different 
sequences typically treated as equivalent. For example, the 
response-sequences S-S-C-C and C-S-C-S both contain fifty percent 
stay-responses; but the first involves a single transition from 
one type of response to the other, whereas the second involves 
three such transitions. 
transitions. 
It is possible to foctlS upon 
Let a pair of contiguous trials, in the abstract, be denoted 
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trial t and trial t+l. Consider the following transition matrix. 
Trial t 
Stay Change 






In this diagram, 1-a is the probability that a11 actor stays on 
trial t+l, given that he or she stayed on trial t. Similarly, 
1-n is the probability that an actor changes on trial t+l, given 
that he or she changed on trial t. And a and n themselves are 
the probabilities of switching. 
It is possible to estimate a and n for eacl1 experimental 
condition, or eVen for each pair of contiguous trials of each 
experimental condition. 
The Sell-Freese statistical test focuses upon these trial-
by-trial sequences; it makes use of a quantity I shall denote r, 
defined as follows: r = TT - a. That is, gammFl is the difference 
between the two switching probabilities. Sell and Freese refer 
to this as " ... the first derivative of the decision process" 
(Sell and Freese 1984: p. 546). 
Let f 1 and f 2 be the "derivatives" from two different 
experimental conditions, which we can call Condition 1 and 
Condition 2, respectively. Sell and Freese assert that r, and r, 
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differ if and only if a different decision process operates in. 
l 
the two experimental conditions. Therefore, they propose testing 
the following null hypothesis: 
They suggest testing this hypothesis over and over again, using 
the data from trials 1 and 2, those from trials 2 and 3, those 
from trials 3 and 4, and so on. Altogether, their procedure 
entails T-1 separate tests, where T is the number of critical 
trials .. 
Hembroff and his associates used this procedure to 
demonstrate the equivalence or non-equivalence of pairs of 
experimental conditions, their objective, in most instances, 
being to choose between their theory and the BFNZ theory. 
While this objective itself may be important, there are 
three difficulties entailed by the Sell-Freese procedure, two 
merely troublesome, the other more serious. Multiple tests such 
as this procedure entails are notoriously difficult to interpret. 
If each component test is carried out at tl1e .05 level, and the 
complete procedure involves T-1 components (thirty-one in the HMS 
research), we would expect some "significant" l"<'fmlts by chance 
alone. Often this type of problem -- simultaneous inferences f,o.r 
a whole family of tests is handled by the Bonferroni method 
(Morrison 1976: 33-34). Sell and Freese do not recommend the 
Bonferroni method; instead, they recommend some ad hoc 
-· -·- ~--·--
adjustments. But if the Bonferroni method were substituted for 
their ad hoc adjustments, the consequence would be many fewer 
apparently significant outcomes. 
A second difficulty is that, if the experimental trials are 
statistically independent (the remaining cases will be considered 
shortly), the test entails a grossly suboptimal tlse of relevant 
information. If the experimental trials are stAtistically 
independent, 1-a = TI = P{S). Thus, r = 2 P(S) - 1. And the null 
hypothesis stated above is logically equivalent to the following: 
Ifo: P(S), = P(S), 
When this is the hypothesis of interest, however, the most 
efficient way to test it is to pool the data from all the trials, 
and carry out a single test. We would not do T-1 s~P_?J;?J:~ tests, 
for that would entail a large loss of statistical power, as well 
as the interpretive ambiguities mentioned above. 
A third difficulty involves the remaining cases, those in 
which the experimental trials are no~ statisticnlly independent. 
In the previous case, the Sell-Freese test, though inefficient, 
is technically valid. In the remaining cases, there is a logical 
problem that makes the test's results much mor" dubious. 
Suppose 1-a is a function of both a subject's expectation 
state and his or her previous involvement in the "decision 
process" (that is, his or her responses on previous trials). ·We 
can represent this as follows: 1-a = f{E,6), where E symbolizes 
a particular theoretical conception of the subject's expectation 
state, 6 indexes the relevant temporal dependencies or history. 
Similarly, suppose TI = g{E, 6). It follows that r = g(E, 6) + 
f{E,6) - 1. Let r be specified as f{E,6), to make explicit its 
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dependence on both the expectation state of the focal actor and 
the history of the decision process through the time-point of 
interest. We must assume here that r does in fact depend upon 6, 
because otherwise we have an independent trials process, and we 
are back to the previous special case. 
The Sell-Freese null hypothesis now becomes equivalent to 
the following, where E and 6 take on the roles of parameters of 
an abstract population defined by an experimental condition: 
1\,: f(E,.6 1 ) = f(E,,6,) 
At this point, the problem for interpreting the results of the 
test can easily be seen. If our theoretical }1yp_o_th_~:;;_es are about 
the compositions of the subjects' expectation states, then no 
conceivable outcome of this test can provide us with trustworthy 
information. If the null hypothesis is rejected, that could be 
because E1 does not equal E,, because 6 1 does not equal 6,, or 
because of some combination of these. Similarly, if the null 
hypothesis is not rejected, that does not imply that E, equals 
E,, for these might have different values which are compensated 
for by differences between 6, and 6,. In short, results from the 
Sell-Freese test confound status information an represented by E, 
and "history effects" as represented by 6.'" 
Given that the various papers by Hembroff, Martin, and Sell 
draw conclusions based almost exclusively upon tests of ordinal 
comparisons and/or tests of differences in ''derivatives,'' and 
given that these methodologies are in question, what can we 
actually conclude from this body of work? 
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Conclusions From the HMS Work 
All the papers by Hembroff, Martin, and Sell embrace certain 
consistent themes, both in their opening statements and in their 
conclusions. They all characterize the early work by Freese and 
Cohen as demonstrating problems with the BFNZ formulation. They 
all characterize their own theoretical work as offering solutions 
to those problems. And they all see their research as confirming 
the validity of their proposed solutions (Hemb1·off, Martin, and 
Sell 1981, p. 429; Hembroff 1982, pp. 200-01; Martin and Sell 
1985, p. 181). These themes require modification in at least the 
following ways. First, neither Freese and Cohen's work nor the 
HMS work itself provides compelling reasons for believing that 
subjects in experiments with strong task-_ori_~_!ltatiQ!!§_ ignore 
relevant status information. Second, no published study has 
successfully differentiated between the BFNZ and HMS formulations 
-- the Hembroff model makes ordinal predictions that, for the 
most part, are identical to those of the BFNZ model. Third, the 
various results from the Sell-Freese statistical test (which show 
no clear pattern anyway) are in question, because the logic of 
that test does not adequately isolate and target the linkages 
between status information, expectation-states, and actions. 
While the preceding remarks take issue with much of the HMS 
work, I must add that this work does have many attractive 
features. The research is creative and informative; and the 
emphasis upon process considerations is an emphasis that the 
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entire field would do well to emulate. 
BROADER SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CRITICAL WORK 
An Alternative Mode of inquiry 
One additional contribution of the critical work, I believe, 
is that it raises questions important for extending any version 
of the theory of status characteristics and social interaction. 
Experiments guided explicitly by the BFNZ formulation have, as a 
matter of strategy, bypassed certain potential issues. 
Experiments not guided as closely by this formulation have 
sometimes employed status manipulations that bring these issues 
to the fore. In this section, I wish to examine--or, in the 
first case, reexamine--work relevant to the theory, employing a 
different strategy. I shall assume that the essential features 
of the BFNZ formulation are correct, and use that assumption to 
infer how subjects must have defined the situations in which they 
found themselves in these studies. While this is not theory-
testing in a strict sense, it is a strategy that could produce 
useful insights. 
The HMS Experiment Revisiteq 
The most provocative part of the HMS theory and research is 
its notion of a status characteristic with subsidiar~ components. 
In the HMS research, if the subtraits of Contrast Sensitivity had 
been given separate names, and been characteristized as separate 
abilities, rather than as components of the same ability, these 
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subtraits would be treated in the BFNZ formulation as multiple 
specific status characteristics. Alternativel.y, if the subtraits 
had been measured with consistent results, the BFNZ formulation 
would clearly apply, although there would be some question at to 
whether Contrast Sensitivity should be treated as one, or more 
than one, specific status characteristic. The HMS experiment 
introduced a variable not found in other status characteristics 
research: the believability of the specific status information. 
My conjecture is that when subjects" performances on tests 
measuring different abilities are if!consistent, this does not 
call into question the credibility of the performance information 
itself. It is readily conceivable for people to have different 
levels of different abilities. In contrast, wl1en subjects" 
performances on tests supposedly measuring the s.a111e. ability are 
grossly inconsistent, that does call into question the accuracy 
or dependability of the performance information. 
I would speculate that experimental subjects, whatever their 
private uneasiness, typically behave as i.f the pe1:formance 
information they receive is valid, so long as the credibility of 
that information is above a certain threshhold. Applications of 
the BFNZ formulation assume that the experimenti'll subjects accept 
the information they have been given as valid. Let CR denote a 
quantitative measure of the credibility of the performance 
information provided to the subjects; and let T denote the 
critical threshhold. My conjecture is: If CR ~ t, the 
principles of the BFNZ formulation operate in a way that is 
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predictable in advance by a researcher; if CR < r, the 
principles of the BFNZ formulation do not operate predictably. 
In the latter instances, subjects make idiosyncratic definitions 
of the situation, which are not easily amenable to research. 
Hembroff's measure of the absolute strength of the 
performance characteristic is plausibly reinterpreted as a 
measure of the credibility of the performance information 
provided in that experimental condition. In addition, Hembroff's 
estimate of the absolute strength of the diffuse status 
characteristic (relative age) is plausibly reinterpreted as an 
estimate of the critical threshhold. (The absolute strength of 
the relative age variable functions as a sort of threshhold in 
Hembroff's analysis.) This estimate is 0.4. I have applied the 
BFNZ formulation to the entire set of fifteen experimental 
conditions, and also to the subset of the HMS data for which CR ~ 
0.4. The results are presented in Tables 13 and 14." 
Table 13 about here 
Table 14 about here 
The results for all fifteen conditions show large discrepancies 
between the observed and predicted P(S) values, but it is not 
clear that the discrepancies are patterned in any way. In 
contrast, the results for the subset for which CR ~ 0.4 indicate 
a fit within the range of statistical acceptability (X 2 = 10.621, 
df = 6, P = .1008). The largest error of prediction is just over 
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.03, four of the errors are less than .01. 
Knottnerus and Greenstein 
Further challenges for the conceptual framework of the BFNZ 
formulation are presented by the work by Greenstein and 
Knottnerus (1980) and Knottnerus and Greenstein (1981). This 
work challenges the limits of the burden-of-proof principle, 
encountered earlier. The burden-of-proof principle states that, 
in forming expectation-states, people use status information that 
differentiates them, even if that information is not initially 
relevant to success or failure at the group's task, unless that 
information is explicitly dissociated from success or failure at 
the group's task. 
In the first phase of their experiment, Greenstein and 
Knottnerus (1980) tested their subjects on an ability referred to 
as "modes of perception," which involved figuring out which of 
two geometric figures predominates in a pattern. The test 
consisted of fifteen patterns shown on a scree11. one after the 
other. For each slide, a subject purportedly could be ''right" or 
"wrong." (In fact, however, the patterns were ambiguous, and 
there were no demonstrably correct or incorrect answers.) After 
the test was completed, it was (purportedly) scored; and, except 
for those in a control group, the subjects were qiven their 
scores. 
Also in the first phase, the subjects were introduced to a 
(fictitious) partner, with whom they were told they would be 
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working during the second phase of the experiment. In four of 
the nine experimental conditions, this introduction constituted a 
relative-age manipulation similar to that described for the HMS 
experiment 
In the second phase, Greenstein and Knottnerus asked the 
naive subject to engage in a collective effort with a ''partner'' 
(purportedly another subject). The collective task was referred 
to as "forming uncommon words." Ability at this task was at no 
time explicitly associated with ability at ''modes of perception." 
This second phase had 30 critical trials. On each trial, the 
naive subject made an initial proposal of an ''uncommon word," 
using sixteen letters projected on a screen by the experimenter. 
The subject's initial proposal then was (purportedly) 
communicated to the other person, and the other person's was 
communicated to the naive subject. Then each subject made a 
final proposal. The final proposal was required to be either the 
subject· s initial proposal or the other person· s i.ni tial 
proposal, received when the initial proposals were communicated. 
The dependent variable was the proportion of times the subject 
used his or her partner's initial proposals. [Greenstein and 
Knottnerus thus report P(C) rather than P(S).] 
Greenstein and Knottnerus (1981) reported results for five 
experimental conditions; Knottnerus and Greenstein (1981) 
reported results for six, four of which were new ones. 
there were nine different experimental conditions. 
In all, 
How did Knottnerus and Greenstein's conditions differ from 
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A simplicity criterion suggests first trying a path that is one 
segment longer, trying more complicated possibilities only if 
this simplest possibility proves empirically inadequate. 
Concerning the "no status information" control group, I opted for 
the conservative hypothesis that a subject's definition of the 
situation in such a condition, since it cannot be based on known 
status characteristics, lies outside the present scope the BFNZ 
formulation. 
Under these hypotheses, I fitted the BFNZ model to the eight 
suitable conditions of Knottnerus and Greenstein's experiment. 
The results are summarized in Table 15. 
Table 15 about here 
From these results, it can be seen that the conformity demands in 
Knottnerus and Greenstein's research setting did indeed greatly 
lower a subject's probability of making a stay~response. In 
addition, as hypothesized, the partially dissociated status 
characteristic (identified in Table 15 by asterisks) did have 
less impact on observable behavior than did the comparable 
(initially) non-associated characteristic. Tal1en as a whole, 
these results are very well described by the BFNZ formulation (X' 
= 3.413, df = 6, p = .7555). 
In should be noted that, if ep - e" = 0, the predicted value 
of P(S) is approximately 0.26. For the "no information'' control 
group, the observed P(S) was approximately 0.32. It would appear 
that "no status information'' does not translate into a cognitive 
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expectation of "no difference in ability." 
Martin and Sell (1985) 
A relatively recent study by Martin and Sell (1985), not 
based on the HMS data, investigates the effects of _Q_iffuse-status 
equating characteri sties. The Berger ~t: ~al. ( 1970) and Webster 
(1977) studies, discussed earlier, investigated the effects of 
specific-status equating characteristics. Although the 
distinction between diffuse and specific status characteristics 
is important for some purposes, the BFNZ formulation actually 
makes very little use of this distinction." 
In Martin and Sell's experiment, the researchers manipulated 
information on a performance characteristic (in BFNZ terms, two 
related specific status characteristics). They created three 
levels: (HH-LL), (LL-HH), and a control level. They also 
manipulated information on a diffuse status characteristic. On 
this second factor, they created two levels: "characteristics 
equated,'' and a control level. To generate the first level, they 
emphasized to the subject that she and her "pat·tner" were equal 
in age, sex, and university classification. In the control 
level, the subject was given no information on the age, sex, or 
university classification of her "partner." The performance and 
diffuse status levels were crossed to define six experimental 
conditions. 
In applying the BFNZ formulation to Martin and Sell's data, 
three observations are pertinent. First, the BFNZ formulation 
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conceives of Martin and Sell's equating characteristics as not 
salient, because, while they were deliberately and emphatically 
brought to the subjects' attention, they were not explicitly 
associated with success or failure at the group's task, 13 
Second, the combination of no performance information with no 
diffuse status information produces a condition like that of the 
control group in Knottnerus and Greenstein's research. And 
third, since diffuse status information is not: :;;aJj~_Q._t;, the 
combination of no performance information with "equating 
information" on diffuse status also produces such a condition. 
As stated previously, such a "no salient status information" 
condition lies outside the present scope of the BFNZ formulation. 
Fitting the BFNZ formulation to the four conditions to which 
it does apply produces the results recorded in Table 16. 
Table 16 about here 
This analysis yields an excellent fit between the model and the 
data (X'= 0.630, df = 2, P = .7298). These results confirm that 
diffuse-status equating characteristics not explicitly associated 
with success or failure at the group's task are 11ot §'!lie)1t, 
which is exactly what the BFNZ formulation predicts. 
Finally, if eP - eo were equal to zero, the predicted value 
of P(S) would be 0.709. The observed P(S) values in the two 
conditions providing no salient status information are 0.732 and 
0.756. 
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Problems for Further Investigatlo~I! 
These experiments were conducted primarily for purposes 
other than testing the BFNZ formulation. Fitting the BFNZ model 
to these data has required some auxiliary assumptions, which 
suggest problems for further study. 
When the subjects in an experiment are provided with no 
salient status information, it must not be assumed that this 
induces them to act without a definition of the situation. 
According to the BFNZ model, if e" - eo 0, P(S) = m, the first 
parameter of the model. The available data are not consistent 
with the idea that an absense of salient status information leads 
to expectations of equal ability. Evidently, actors in such 
circumstances attend to other cues, forming expectations on the 
basis of those other cues. While some work relevant to this 
problem has already been done (see Berger EO_t al. 1985), learning 
more about the cues to which people attend seRms fundamental to 
progress in theory of status characteristics and social 
interaction. 
Another problem requiring more study is that of how people 
complete their definitions of the situation whe11 they have 
available partially dissociated status information. The BFNZ 
formulation conceptualizes such completion processes in terms of 
paths-of-relevance. For the most part, there exist clear 
rationales for ascertaining the path lengths involved (see Berger 
et~. 1977, PP. 100-21). In analyzing the Knottnerus and 
Greenstein data, I posited path lengths that seem correct in that 
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they provide a good empirical fit; but compelling theoretical 
rationales for these remain to be developed. 
Finally, it is important to learn more about the operation 
of status organizing processes in situations with conformity 
demands. In the classic expectation-states experiment, 
conformity demands are effectively neutralized by the 
experimental procedures. But researchers increasingly are 
developing and employing open-interaction designs (see, for 
example, Rainwater et al. 1988; Ridgeway 1987; and Ridgeway and 
Diekema 1989). In open-interaction experiments, there is no 
clear way to eliminate the social pressures that stem from 
people's desires for social approval. Perhaps such pressures 
could be considered constant across experimental conditions in 
some cases, but ultimately the most effective way to handle the 
complications that arise as we move to open-interaction 
experiments, in my judgment, is to build models that 
simultaneously deal with status organizing processes and 
conformity processes. Grounded in the understa11dings gained from 
status characteristics theories and research, it should be 
feasible to pursue this objective. The result. if successful, 
would be a general theory of status characteristics and social 
influence, dealing simultaneously with the formntion of 
expectation states and with the quest for social approval, the 
latter grounded to some degree in the emotional needs of the 
actors in a social situation. 
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ASSESSMENT OF THE COMPETING FORMULATIONS 
The principal purpose of the foregoing analyses is to assess 
a body of theoretically motivated research bearing directly on 
the theory of status characteristics and social interaction. 
Without question, the most prominant formulation of the theory is 
that presented in the Berger et al. (1977) treatise; however, in 
recent years a number of competing formulations have been 
proposed, most notably the theory of status-inconsistency effects 
set forth by Hembroff et ~- , and the theory of status validation 
set forth by Knottnerus and Greenstein. 14 
The emergence of competing or variant theories is a healthy 
development, an indication of the vitality of an area of inquiry. 
For the benefits of the competition to be most fully realized, it 
is necessary, from time to time, to take stock of the various 
formulations and try to choose among them. 
How can this be done? Why should we prefer one theory of 
status characteristics and social interaction to another? There 
is no simple and definitive answer to such a question, but 
certainly considerations of em~i_!:"_iC:~J. __ .,cl~qu;e~c_y, scope, and 
fruitfulness are very important. Concerning this first, this 
paper has shown that the BFNZ formulation is remarkably 
successful in accounting for a variety of empirical data, both 
those collected to test the BFNZ formulation itself, and those 
collected for other purposes. That the BFNZ formulation rates 
high on empirical adequacy is an inescapable conclusion from the 
set of analyses contained in this paper. Since the other 
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criteria have not been explicitly considered, it is appropriate 
to close with a brief assessment of the scope and fruitfulness of 
the alternative theoretical formulations. 
Concerning scope, the HMS and Knottnerus-Greenstein 
formulations are relatively narrow in their range of application. 
The HMS formulation does not apply unless a performance 
characteristic has at least two subtraits. The authors assure 
that this will be true by fiat, that is, by their definition of a 
performance characteristic. But this does not bannish the 
question of how an actor will process status information when 
that information includes knowledge of just a _s:i,ngJ~ skill or 
ability, with or without additional information about diffuse 
status. The great majority of status characteristics experiments 
described in the literature thus lie outside the scope of the 
Hembroff et al. theorizing. Similarly, the Knottnerus-Greenstein 
theory applies only if a situation tenders information about both 
specific and diffuse status characteristics and the rank-
orderings produced by the associated evaluations are consistent. 
In contrast, the BFNZ formulation accounts for status organizing 
processes in both these kinds of situations, and in many more as 
well. 
Since 1977, the BFNZ formulation has been enormously · 
fruitful, stimulating the growth of sociological knowledge in 
several different directions, applied as well as theoretical 
(see, for example, the many theoretical, research, and 
applications papers in Berger and Zelditch 1985; Webster and 
45 
Foschi 1988; and Berger et al. 1989). The BFNZ book explicates 
an interrelated set of substantive ideas, a few of which are the 
burden-of-proof principle, the principle of organized subsets, 
and the attenuation principle. In addition, the BFNZ book sets 
forth a system for diagramming an actor's initial and completed 
definitions of the situation, the transitions between the two 
deriving from the principles just mentioned. These diagrams are 
much more than cosmetic. They provide a sociological 
interpretation of some abstract ideas from the area of 
mathematics known as graph theory. The correspondence between 
the sociological theory and the mathematical system has permitted 
researchers to deduce the implications of the sociological theory 
for situations involving any numbers of actors, possessing any 
number of specific and/or diffuse status characteristics, 
constrained or unconstrained by an external reward structure. 
As research guided by the BFNZ theory progresses, the 
sociological community will slowly but surely come to understand 
where the theory may need revision. Formal theory serves that 
very important function: It guides the research that eventually 
isolates its own weaknesses. While the efforts of those who have 
proposed alternative formulations have a great deal of merit, it 
nevertheless would promote faster progress if more efforts were 
directed towards the more modest goal of isolating replicable 
patterns. No proposal for a new formulation makes much of a 
contribution to cumulative scholarship unless the proposed 
formulation, compared to the one it is intended to replace, has 
clearly superior predictive validity, along with comparable scope 
and fruitfulness. 
APPENDIX A 
COMPUTATION OF AN ACTOR'S EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE 
The Focal Actor's Expectation Advanta~ 
In the BFNZ theory of status characteristics and social 
interaction, the actors in a social situation are seen as being 
connected to the possible task outcomes by paths-of-relevance. 
For anyone who wishes to use the theory in their own research, 
pages 91-134 of the BFNZ treatise are essential reading. This 
appendix deals mainly with computational procedures for obtaining 
the numerical value of an actor's expectation advantage, as the 
latter is conceptualized in the theory. 
Consider a relatively simple situation entailing two actors, 
p and o, working together on a task T. By convention, p is the 
actor upon whom the analysis focuses. Let C* denote the talent 
or ability instrumental to success at T. And suppose p possesses 
a relatively high level of C*, while o possesses a relatively low 
level.' By hypothesis, the focal actor's definition of the 
situation can be diagrammed as follows: 
'This notation is fairly standard in the literature. 
Ordinarily, the task is best thought of as a subtask, or limited 
part, of some larger endeavor. In the classic expectation-states 
experiment, it is a single trial, which is merely a piece of what 
the subjects themselves think of as the task. 
47 
+ + 




+ I + I 
0 -------- C*(-) -------- T (-) 
This diagram is the graph-theoretic representation of the 
essential elements of the situation. It is hypothesized that p 
is connected to the possible task outcomes by two positive paths 
of lengths 2 and 3, while o is connected by two negative paths, 
also of lengths 2 and 3. Verbally: (1) "p has a high level of 
the task ability, which is associated with success at the task," 
(2) "p has a high level of the task ability, which is the reverse 
of a low level, which is associated with failure at the task," 
(3) "o has a low level of the task ability, which is associated 
with failure at the task," and (4) "o has a low level of the task 
ability, which is the reverse of a high level, which is 
associated with success at the task." Notice thAt the J_en_g_th of 
a path corresponds to the number of segments in a parsimonious 
but complete chain of reasoning. 
The path-segments have signs, + or - , asc;oci a ted with ·them. 
When a path-segment corresponds to the phrase, "is the reverse 
of'' [for instance, the segment between C*(+) and C*(-)], the 
sign is a "minus." In all other cases, the sign is a "plus." 
Dimensionality relations (those with "minus" signs) exist only 
between oppositely evaluated states of a status characteristic. 
The sign of an entire path is obtained by multiplying the 
signs of its segments, along with the sign of the task outcome at 
the end of it, using a rule analogous to that of ordinary algebra 
for multiplying signed numbers. For the respective paths of my 
example, (+)(+)(+) = (+), (+)(-)(+)(-) = (+), (+)(+)(-) = (-), 
and(+)(-)(+)(+)= (-). Thus, p's two paths are positive, and 
o·s two paths are negative. 
It is essential to distinguish between positive and negative 
paths, because the subsets of each person's paths defined by this 
distinction (four subsets in all) must be dealt with separately 
in computing p's expectation advantage. The need for separate 
consideration is due to the principle of org~ni . :eg l"_Ubsets, an 
important substantive principle of the theory. 
In making the computations for obtaining e" - eo, it is 
helpful to organize the calculations for each subset in 
accordance with a table such as the following: 

















In the BFNZ theory, f(i) is the strength of a path of length i, 
conceptualized as a real number between zero and one. 
Notice that path-lengths less than 2 or greater than 6 are 
not represented in this table. This is because such paths do not 
enter into the calculations. Theoretically, the strength of a 
path of length 1 can be thought of as the believability of a 
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single path-segment (for instance, "pis male"), which is 
considered to be near one (on a scale of zero to one). At the 
other end, a path of length 7 is presumed to have a strength near 
zero, which is why such paths need not be considered. In 
general, the longer the path, the less its strength. Stated 
another way, the longer a path-of-relevance, the more tenuous the 
inferences it permits to the focal actor. 
The combined strength of a subset of paths is calculated 
from the following formula: 
e = 1 - [ [ 1- f ( 2 ) J "2 [ 1- f ( 3 ) J "3 [ 1 J 
For a two-person situation, there are four. such calculations that 
must be made. In our illustration: 
[[1-f(2)] 1 [1-f(3)] 1 [1-f(4)] 0 ••• [l-f(6)] 0 l 
= 1 [[l-f(2)] ·[1-f(3)] ·1·1·11 
= f(2) + f(3) - f(2)·f(3) 
ep- = 1 [ [ 1-f(2) ] 0 [ 1-f(3) ]0 ... [ l-f(6) 1°1 
= 1 [1·1·1·1·11 = 0 
eo. = 1 [ [ 1-f(2) ]0 [ 1-f(3) ]0 . .. [1-f<G>n = 0 
eo_ = 1 [[1-f(2)] 1 [1-f(3)] 1 [1-f(4)] 0 ... [ 1-f(6) ] 0 1 
= f(2) + f(3) - f(2) ·f(3) 
After these four results have been obtained, we can compute an 
actor's (hypothesized) expectation advantage for the experimental 
condition in question. 
= [ 2 J 
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This formula implies that p · s expectatio!l .11<1vant~ is 
enhanced by o's negatively evaluated status characteristics, as 
well as by his own positively evaluated status characteristics. 
It is diminished by o's positively evaluated characteristics, as 
well as by his own negatively evaluated characteristics. Formula 
[2] also implies that p's "advantage" may be negative--that is, 
it may be a disadvantage. 
Values of the f(i) Terms 
We have been taking for granted that the f(i) quantities 
have definite numerical values. What are those values, and from 
where do they come? The 1977 version of the theory treated the 
f(i) terms as parameters to be estimated from the research data. 
Only two of them were conceived as independent, however, because 
of a theoretical relationship among them. This theoretical 
relationship can be stated as follows: There exists some fixed 
number k such that, for all permissible values of i, 
f(i) = 1- [1-f(i+l)]" [ 3] 
More recently, there have been efforts to find a priQEi values, 
as opposed to estimated values, having some compelling 
theoretical rationale (see Fisek, Norman, and Nelson-Kilger 
1989). For the analyses of this paper, I employed a set of a 
priori values not previously found in the literature, which I 
shall now describe. 
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Given the constraint stated in formula [31, we can deduce 
that, for all permissible values of i, and for every positive 
integer n; the following holds true: 
[Log[l-f(i)))/[Log[l-f(i+n)l) = k" [ 41 
As suggested above, the hypothetical path-strength f(l) has long 
been assumed to be close to one, and f(7) has long been assumed 
to be close to zero. Zero and one are the asymptotic values of 
the function, f(i), as i approaches plus infinity and minus 
infinity, respectively. Thus, the assumption Js that f(i) has 
nearly reached it lower limit when i = 1, and !1ear_Jy reached its 
upper limit when i = 7. Let us interpret near)y as meaning to 
two decimal places.' That is, let f(l) = 0.995 and f(7) = 0.005. 
Now take i = 1 and n = 6 in formula [4) above; and substitute the 
postulated values of f(l) and f(7). 
k 6 = 1057; therefore, k = 3.192. 
Solving for k 6 , we find that 
At this point, we have the values of f(l), f(7), and k. 
From the last two of these, using formula [3), we can calculate 
f(6). From f(6) and k, we can then calculate f(5). From f(5) 
and k, we can then calculate f(4). And so on. When we finally 
'This choice is less arbitrary than it might appear; it is 
constrained by the value of k it produces. A more stringent 
criterion (for what is meant by "nearly zero" and "nearly one") 
leads to a larger value of k, a more lax criterion to a smaller 
value. The constraint is that k has a substantive meaning, viz., 
the number of paths of length L+l equivalent (in information 
value) to a single path of length L. The correct value of k is 
ultimately an empirical question; but a value in the neighborhood 
of three is most often considered to be substantively plausible 
(cf. Berger et al. 1977, p. 138). 
obtain f(2), we can use formula [3] to verify that f(l) = 0.995. 
Carrying out the arithmetic to several significant digits, I 
arrived at the following values: f(2) = 0.809873, f(3) = 
0.405556, f(4) = 0.150380, f(5) = 0.049779, and f(6) = 0.015871. 
That these ~ priori values are not too far from the empirical 
estimates reported by Berger et al. (1977) is remarkable. It is 
encouraging that their estimates are very consistent with 
reasonable assumptions about path-lengths outside the range 
employed to calculate e. - eo. 
Returning to the illustration of section one of this 
Appendix, we find: 
e •• = f(2) + f(3)- f(2)·f(3) 
= 0.809873 + 0.405556- (.809873)(.405556) 
= 0.886980 
e._ = 0. 000000 
eo. = 0. 000000 
e 0 _ = 0. 886980 
Now using formula [2], the formula for an actor's expectation 
advantage, we get: 
e. - eo = [0.88698 - 0.00000] - [0.00000 - 0.88698] 
= 1. 77396 
This, then, is the value of p's expectation advantage for a 
situation like that described. 
For many situations, the graph hypothesized to represent the 
focal actor's definition of the situation should include multiple 
status characteristics, specific and/or diffuse. In some cases, 
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this graph should include actors besides p and o, and in some it 
should include aspects of reward systems imported from the larger 
cultural or structural context. The principles illustrated in 
this Appendix are by no means limited to simple cases like the 
one of my example. They can be applied to much more elaborate 





















TABLES SUMMARIZING EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Freese and Cohen (1973) - Combining Mode Hypothesized 
Freese and Cohen (1973) - Balancing Mode Hypothesized 
Webster and Driskell (1978) - Combining Mode 
Webster and Driskell (1978) - Balancing Mode 
Zelditch et al. (1980) - Combining Mode Hypothesized 
Zeldi tch et al. ( 1980) - Balancing Mode Hypothesized 
Berger et al. (1970) - Equating Char. Salient 
Berger et al. (1970) - Equating Char. Not Salient 
Webster (1977) - Equating Characteristic Salient 
Webster (1977) - Equating Characteristic Not Salient 
Freese and Cohen (1973) - Hembroff Model Hypothesized 
HMS Results - Hembroff Model Hypothesized 
HMS Results - BFNZ Formulation - All 15 Conditions 
HMS Results - BFNZ Formulation- CR ~ 0.4 Subset 
Knottnerus and Greenstein (1980-81) - BFNZ Model 
Martin and Sell (1985) - BFNZ Formulation Applied 
Freese and Cohen (1973) - Combining - Alternative 
Freese and Cohen (1973) - Balancing - Alternative 
Freese and Cohen (1973) - Hembroff Model - Alt. 
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TABLE 1. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY FREESE & COHEN (1973). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) I DISCREPANCY! 
(H-L)( ) 0.38535 0 6969 0.6970 0 0001 
( L -H) ( ) 
-0.38535 0.5938 0.5968 0 0031 
( )(HH-LL) 0 69645 0. 7375 0. 7374 0 0001 
( )(LL-HH) -0 69645 0.5687 0.5564 0 0123 
(H-L)(LL-HH) -0.31110 0. 5906 0 6065 0 0159 
(L-H)(HH-ll) 0.31110 0 6937 0 6874 0 0064 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.64693 + 0.12997 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 1.217, DEGREES OF FREEDOM= 4. P = 0.8753 
NOTE: COMBINING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
..... 
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TABLE 2. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY FREESE & COHEN (1973). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) I DISCREPANCY! 
( H- L) ( ) 0.38535 0.6969 0.6863 0.0105 
(L-H)( ) 
-0.38535 0.5938 0.6074 0.0137 
( )(HH-LL) 0.69645 0.7375 0.7182 0.0193 
( )(LL-HH) -0.69645 0.5687 0.5756 0.0068 
(H-L)(LL-HH) 
-0.69645 0.5906 0.5756 0.0150 
(L-H)(HH-LL) 0.69645 0.6937 0.7182 0.0244 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.64688 + 0.10237 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 4.615, DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 4, P = 0.3291 
NOTE: BALANCING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
00 
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TABLE 3. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY WEBSTER & DRISKELL (1978). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY! 
( H-l) ( ) 0.38535 0.6773 0.6803 0.0030 
(H-L)(LL-HH) -0.31110 0.5833 0.5734 0.0099 
( )(LL-HH) -0.69645 0.5075 0.5143 0 0068 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.62116 + 0.15339 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 0.261, DEGREES OF FREEDOM= 1, P = 0.6095 
NOTE: COMBINING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
c, 
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TABLE 4. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY WEBSTER & DRISKELL (1978). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) IOISCREPANCYI 
(H-L)( ) 0.38535 0 6773 0.6773 a oooo 
(H-L)(LL-HH) -0.69645 0 5833 0 5463 0 0370 
( )(LL-HH) -0.69645 0. 5075 0.5463 0.0388 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.63063 + 0.12103 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 4.754, DEGREES OF FREEDOM= 1. P = 0.0292 
NOTE: BALANCING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
"' 
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TABLE 7. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY BERGER ET AL. (1970). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY! 
)(HH-LL) 1.48985 0.8212 0.8055 0.0156 
)(HH-LH) 0.78917 0.7185 0. 7420 0.0235 
)(HL-LH) 0.00000 0.6615 0.6705 0.0089 
)(LH-HH) -0.78917 0.6205 0.5989 0.0215 
)(LL-HH) -1.48985 0.5333 0.5354 0.0021 
PREDICTED P(S) = 0.67047 + 0.09064 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 3.412. DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 3, P = 0.3325 
NOTE' EQUATING CHARACTERISTICS ASSUMED SALIENT 
"" 
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TABLE 8. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY BERGER ET AL. (1970). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) I DISCREPANCY I 
)(HH-LL) 1 . 48985 0.8212 0. 7950 0 0262 
)(HH-LH) 0.98990 0.7185 0.7531 0 0346 
)(HL-LH) 0.00000 0.6615 0.6702 0 0086 
)(LH-HH) -0.98990 0.6205 0.5872 0 0332 
)(ll-HH) -1.48985 0.5333 0.5453 0 0120 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.67015 + 0.08378 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 8.115, DEGREES OF FREEDOM= 3, P = 0.0438 
NOTE: EQUATING CHARACTERISTICS ASSUMED NOT SALIENT 
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TABLE 9. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY WEBSTER (1977). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) \DISCREPANCY\ 
( )(AH-AL) 1.52725 0. 7364 0. 7362 0.0001 
( )(AL-AH) ··1. 52725 0.4200 0.4270 0.0070 
( ) (H-L) 1. 77396 0.7250 0.7612 0.0362 
( ) (L-H) -1.77396 0.4136 0.4020 0.0116 
( )( HH-HL) 1. 52725 0. 7600 0.7362 0.0238 
( )(HL-HH) -1.52725 0.3762 0.4270 0.0508 
( ) (H-L) 1.77396 0.7804 0.7612 0.0192 
( ) ( L -H) -1.77396 0.4405 0.4020 0.0384 
PREDICTED P(S) = 0.58162 + 0.10123 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 12.614, DEGREES OF FREEDOM 6, p = 0.0496 
NOTE: EQUATING CHARACTERISTICS ASSUMED SALIENT 
""' 
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TABLE 10. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY WEBSTER ( 1977). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) I DISCREPANCY! 
)(AH-AL) 1. 77396 0. 7364 o. 7506 0.0142 
)(AL-AH) -1.77396 0. 4200 0.4125 0.0075 
) (H-L) 1.77396 0.7250 0. 7506 0.0256 
) (L-H) -1.77396 0.4136 0.4125 0.0011 
)(HH-HL) 1.77396 0. 7600 0.7506 0.0094 
) (HL-HH) -1.77396 0.3762 0.4125 0.0363 
) (H-L) 1. 77396 0.7804 0.7506 0.0299 
) (L-H) -1.77396 0.4405 0.4125 0.0280 
PREDICTED P(S) = 0.58154 + 0.09529 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 8. 129, DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 6, P = 0.2288 
NOTE: EQUATING CHARACTERISTICS ASSUMED NOT SALIENT 
'" 
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TABLE 11. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY FREESE & COHEN (1973) 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION STATE VALUE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY I 
(H-L)( ) 0 70000 0.6969 0.6759 0.0210 
( L -H) ( ) 0 30000 0. 5938 0.6179 0.0242 
( )(HH-LL) 1.00000 0.7375 0.7193 0.0182 
( )(LL-HH) 0 00000 0.5687 0.5745 0.0057 
(H-L)(LL-HH) 0 00000 0.5906 0.5745 0.0162 
(L-H)(HH-LL) 1 .00000 0.6937 0.7193 0.0256 
PREDICTED P(S) = 0.57445 + 0.14486 (EXPECTATION STATE VALUE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 6.763, DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 4, P = 0.1490 
NOTE: RESULTS BASED ON HEMBROFF MODEL 
r. 
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TABLE 12. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY HEMBROFF, MARTIN. & SELL 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION STATE VALUE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY I 
( )(3H1L) 0 75000 0.6712 0.6690 0 0022 
(L-H)(3H1L) 0 65000 0.6762 0.6485 0 0277 
( L -H) ( ) 0. 30000 0.5987 0.5769 0 0219 
(L-H)(2H1L) 0. 40000 0.5900 0.5974 0 0074 
( )(2H1L) 0.66667 0.6058 0.6519 0 0462 
( )( 1H2L) 0.33333 0.5737 0.5837 0.0100 
(H-L)( 1H2L) 0.60000 0.6675 0.6383 0.0292 
(H-L)l ) 0. 70000 0 6762 0.6588 0 0175 
(H-L)(1H3L) 0.35000 0 6037 0.5871 0 0166 
( )( 1H3L) 0.25000 0.5725 0.5667 0 0058 
( )(2H2L) 0. 50000 0.5750 0.6178 0 0428 
(L-H)(2H2L) 0. 30000 0 5912 0.5769 0 0144 
(H-L)(2H2L) 0. 70000 0 6775 0.6588 0 0187 
( )(4H1L) 0.80000 0 6600 0.6792 0 0192 
( )(1H4L) 0. 20000 0 5300 0.5564 0 0264 
PREDICTED P(S) = 0.51549 + 0.20468 (EXPECTATION STATE VALUE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED = 29.432, DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 13, P = 0.0057 
NOTE: RESULTS BASED ON HEMBROFF MODEL 
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TABLE 13. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY HEMBROFF, MARTIN, & SELL. 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) IDISCREPANCYI 
( )(3H1L) 0 56226 0.6712 0.6691 0.0022 
(L-H)(3H1L) 0.25116 0.6762 0.6407 0.0355 
( L -H) ( ) -0.38535 0.5987 0.5827 0.0161 
(L-H)(2H1L) 0 00000 0. 5900 0.6178 0.0278 
( )(2H1L) 0. 31110 0.6058 0.6462 0.0404 
( )(1H2L) -0.31110 0.5737 0.5894 0.0157 
(H-L)(1H2L) 0.00000 0.6675 0.6178 0.0497 
(H-L)( ) 0.38535 0.6762 0.6530 0.0233 
(H-L)( 1H3L) -0.25116 0.6037 0.5949 0.0088 
( )( 1H3L) -0.56226 0.5725 0 5665 0.0060 
( )(2H2L) 0.00000 0.5750 0 6178 0.0428 
(H-L)(2H2L) 0.25116 0.6775 0 6407 0.0368 
(L-H)(2H2L) -0.25116 0 5912 0 5949 0.0037 
( )(4H1L) 0. 76503 0.6600 0 6876 0.0276 
( )( 1H4L) -0.76503 0. 5300 0 5480 0.0180 
PREDICTED P(S) = 0 61781 + 0 09119 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED = 40.131, DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 13, p = 0.0001 
NOTE: COMBINING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
"' 
'"' 
TABLE 14. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY~RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY HEMBROFF, MARTIN. & SELL. 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY I 
) ( 4H1 L) 0.76503 0 6600 0 6922 0 0322 
( )(3H1L) 0.56226 0 6712 0 6740 0 0028 
(L-H)(3H1L) 0.25116 0 6762 0 6460 0 0302 
( L -H) ( ) ~o.38535 0.5987 0 5888 0 0099 
(H-L)( ) 0.38535 0 6762 0 6581 0 0181 
(H-L)( 1H3L) -0.25116 0 6037 0 6009 0 0029 
( )(1H3L) -0.56226 0.5725 0.5729 0 0004 
( )(1H4L) ~o. 76503 0 5300 0.5547 0 0247 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.62347 + 0.08990 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED = 10.621, DEGREES OF FREEDOM~ 6, P = 0.1008 
NOTE: COMBINING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
0 ,_ 
TABLE 15. ·OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY KNOTTNERUS & GREENSTEIN. 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY I 
)(•H-L) 0.12972 0.2883 0.::!.849 0.0035 
)(•L-H) -0.12972 0.2426 0.2363 0.0063 
) ( H- L) 0.38535 0.3118 0.3328 0.0210 
( ) ( L -H) 
-0.38535 0. 1937 0.1883 0.0054 
( H- L) ( ) 0.38535 0. 3200 0.3328 0.0128 
( L -H) ( J -0.38535 0.2044 0. 1883 0.0161 
(H-L)( H-L) 0 69645 0 4067 0. 3911 0.0156 
(L-H)( L-H) 
-0 69645 0. 1178 0.1300 0.0123 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.26056 + 0.18740 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 3.413, DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 6, P = 0.7555 
NOTE: COMBINING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
.... 
,, 
TABLE 16. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY MARTIN & SELL (1985). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY I 
)(HH-LL) 0 69645 0. 7766 0. 7800 0 0034 
)(LL-HH) -0.69645 0.6293 0.6373 0 0081 
)(HH-LL) 0 69645 0. 7834 0. 7800 0 0034 
) ( LL-HH) -0 69645 0.6459 0.6373 0 0085 
PREDICTED P(S) ~ 0.70868 + 0.10247 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 0.630. DEGREES OF FREEDOM= 2, P = 0.7298 
NOTE: COMBINING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
. ..., 
·-
TABLE 1a. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY FREESE & COHEN (1973). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) I DISCREPANCY I 
( H- L) ( ) 0.38535 0. 7375 0. 6911 0.0464 
(L-H)( ) 
-0.38535 0. 5687 0.6026 0.0339 
( )(HH-LL) 0 69645 0.6969 0. 7268 0.0299 
( )(LL-HH) -o 69645 0.5938 0.5669 0.0269 
(H-L)(LL-HH) -0.31110 o. 5906 0 6111 0.0205 
(L-H)(HH-LL) 0. 31110 0.6937 0.6826 0.0112 
PREDICTED P(S) ; 0.64685 + 0.11481 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 15.791, DEGREES OF FREEDOM= 4, P; 0.0033 
~OTE: COMBINING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
<'1 
..... 
TABLE 2a. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY FREESE & COHEN ( 1973). 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION ADVANTAGE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY I 
(H-L)( ) 0.38535 0.7375 0.6826 0 0549 
(L-H)( ) -0.38535 0.5687 0. 6111 0 0423 
( )(HH-LL) 0.69645 0 6969 0.7114 0 0146 
( )(LL-HH) -0.69645 0.5938 0.5822 0.0115 
(H-L)(LL-HH) -0.69645 0.5906 0.5822 0.0084 
( L-H) (HH-LL) 0.69645 0 6937 0.7114 0.0177 
PREDICTED P(S) 0.64684 + 0.09275 (EXPECTATION ADVANTAGE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED 15.908, DEGREES OF FREEDOM = 4, P = 0.0031 
NOTE: BALANCING MODE HYPOTHESIZED 
"' ..... 
TABLE 11a. OBSERVED AND PREDICTED PROPORTIONS OF STAY-RESPONSES FOR THE 
EXPERIMENTAL CONDITIONS STUDIED BY FREESE & COHEN (1973) 
ACTOR'S EXPECTATION OBSERVED PREDICTED 
CONDITION STATE VALUE P(S) P(S) !DISCREPANCY! 
(H-L)( ) 0. 70000 0.7375 0.6720 0.0655 
( L-H) ( ) o. 30000 0.5687 0.6217 0.0529 
( )(HH-LL) 1.00000 0.6969 0. 7098 0.0129 
( )(LL-HH) 0.00000 0.5938 0.5839 0.0099 
(H-L)(LL-HH) 0.00000 0. 5906 0.5839 0.0067 
(L-H)(HH-LL) 1.00000 0.6937 0. 7098 0.0160 
PREDICTED P(S) = 0.58389 + 0.12590 (EXPECTATION STATE VALUE) 
PEARSON'S CHI-SQUARED • 21.761, DEGREES OF FREEDOM= 4, P = 0.0002 
NOTE: RESULTS BASED ON HEMBROFF MODEL 
NOTES 
'These research studies are in fact critical in two senses 
of the word critical. First, they seek to cla~ify critically 
important theoretical issues. Second, they report assessments of 
findings that are to some degree negative for the BFNZ theory. 
"In all the analyses reported in this article, the 
parameters of the models are estimated by the method of maximum 
likelihood, as described by McCullagh and Nelder (1983: Chapter 
4). Nominally, the computational algorithm I used requires that 
experimental trials be statistically independent; however, as 
McCullagh and Nelder point out (1983: 79), the estimates have 
desirable statistical properties under much less restrictive 
assumptions. 
3 1 have made one change in the descriptive statistics 
reported by Freese and Cohen. In their tables (1973: 191), the 
status-only and performance-only statistics appear to have been 
interchanged. The difference between the high-status and low-
status P(S) values is reported to be .17; that between the high-
performance and low-performance P(s) values is reported to be 
only .10. There are three reasons why I believe this is not 
correct. First, it contradicts Freese and Cohen's own theory 
(1973: 181-186), which states that a performance characteristic 
is stronger and more generalizable than a diffuse status 
characteristic (the former being two specific abHities assigned 
so that the "high" subject is high on both, the "low" subject low 
on both). Without this assumption, their explAnation of their 
results is invalid, and surely they would have ~ecognized that if 
the st•tistics as given were other than a repo~ting error. 
Second, Hembroff (1982) carried out a virtual ~eplication of the 
status-only conditions, finding a P(S) diffe~ence of .08. This 
is close to the .10 of the Freese-Collen research, but less than 
half the .17. Third, the descriptive statistics as given are 
grossly discrepant from the predictions of all three of the 
models considered in this paper. For the "combining model" (see 
the discussion in the text), a chi-squared goodness-of-fit test 
strongly rejects the model (X'= 15.791, df = 4, P < .001); for 
the ''balancing model,'' the same is true (X'= 15.908, df = 4, P < 
.001); and for the Hembroff model, the fit is extremely poor (X' 
= 21.761, df = 4, P < . 0005). Detailed summaries of these 
results are presented in Tables la, 2a, and lla in Appendix B. 
Rectifying this apparent transposition does not invalidate 
Freese and Cohen's substantive conclusions. On the contrary, it 
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strengthens them. Taken exactly as they are displayed, the 
Freese-Cohen descriptive statistics present a baffling anomally 
for all variants of status characteristics theory. Nor does this 
change have any crucial significance for my argument in this 
paper, which is that the Freese-Cohen ·results do 11gt support a 
balancing hypothesis more strongly than they support a combining 
hypothesis, a conclusion that is sustained by Tables 1a and 2a, 
as well as by Tables 1 and 2 (see Appendix B). 
'The formula for computing the Pearson chi-squared statistic 
is as follows: 
c 
X' = t I ni [(pi- 11i)'/[11i(l-11i)i} 
i=l 
In this expression, t is the number of critical trials, which is 
constant across experimental conditions. The summation is across 
experimental conditions. Terms to the right of the summation 
operator may differ for different experimental conditions, n 
being the number of subjects, p the observed P(S) value, and 11 
the P(S) value predicted by the model in question. 
5Zelditch, Lauderdale, and Stublarec (1980) presented 
results for conditions 2 and 5 separately for two subsamples of 
subjects. The corresponding pairs of P(S) values do not differ 
by a statistically significant amount, and are not predicted to 
differ by the BFNZ formulation; therefore, for pta·poses of this 
analysis, I pooled the subsamples. 
"Berger (1988), however, suggests that a balancing principle 
may operate in other kinds of social situations. One hypothesis 
is that balancing occurs when a person's motivations are 
primarily social-emotional, as opposed to instrumental. If 
maintaining a person relationship is primary, successfully 
accomplishing a task secondary, there may be strong pressures to 
eliminate information. The maintenance of close personal 
relationships may be next to impossible ur~les_s_ each person 
overlooks information threatening or uncomfortRble for the other. 
While the suggested line of research unquestionably is important, 
this paper considers only situations in which both actors are 
strongly task-oriented, and in which social-emotional motivations 
play little or no part (for instance, interactions in juries as 
opposed to those in families). 
'Webster presented two sets of results, each involving four 
experimental conditions. Two conditions in the second set were 
replications of conditions in the first set. The subject samples 
differed somewhat between the two sets, but not in ways the BFNZ 
formulation treats as important. Since the col-responding sets of 
P(S) values were nearly identical and not predicted to differ by 
the theory, I pooled the samples for purposes of this analysis. 
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"Hembroff's formula involves the signed strength of a 
diffuse status characteristic and that of a performance 
characteristic. Let S denote the signed strength of either 
characteristic. When the necessary information is available, 
this is estimated from the formula, S = (P- N)/(P + N), where P 
denotes the number if elements for which the focal actor is 
"high," N that for which he or she is "low." (Hembroff's 
notation is somewhat more involved than this, but the algebra is 
equivalent.) The absolute strength of a characteristic is the 
absolute value of the signed strength. Let S, denote the signed 
strength of the characteristic with the greater absolute 
strength, s, that of the characteristic with the lesser absolute 
strength, whichever those might be. In terms of s, and s,, an 
actor's expectation state value is posited to be: 
ESV = ~ + ~ [ s, + ( 1 - Is, I ) s, l 
In the case of the relative-age characteristic, Hembroff 
estimated that s.~ = ± 0.4 (by a trial-and-error process). In 
the case of Contrast Sensitivity, he estimated S~·· = (P - N)/ 
(P + N), using the numbers of positive and negative results from 
the tests of subtraits, as specified in the scJ:ipt for the 
experimental condition in question. 
9Choosing between their own formulation and the BFNZ 
formulation clearly is Hembroff's objective. Given the data at 
hand, this does not seem possible. For the fifteen conditions of 
the HMS experiment, the rank-order correlation between the two 
formulations' expectation-state variables, ESV and eP - eo, is 
.98, or nearly perfect. Contrary to the impression Hembroff's 
paper gives, the HMS and BFNZ formulations actually make 
identical rank-order predictions for every one of the pairs 
appearing in that paper's four hypotheses. 
10The question could be asked: Does this same problem 
plague tests based upon the overall P(S) values? The answer 
depends upon the model proposed. For a very flexible class of 
models, however, the answer is !l_CC· Let ¢(E) denote a strictly 
increasing function of the focal actor's expectation-state value, 
scaled so that its range is in the interval, zero to one. Let 
q(t,6) be a function of whatever temporal factors operate in the 
experiment (anxiety, fatigue, etc.), constructed so that, if 6 = 
0, q(t, 6) = 1. In words, 6 is a parameter, or vector of 
parameters, that indexes the effects of temporal factors; and 
q(t,6) is a conception of how those effects combine and impact 
upon response probabilities. A class of models that can be 
called ''proportional switching-rates models'' is defined as 
follows: 
a = P (ct., 1 st) = q ( t, 6 )[ 1-¢ (E) J 
TI = P (st., 1 ct) = q ( t, 6 ) [ HE) l 
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For this class of models, the Sell-Freese ''derivative" and the 
overall probability of a stay-response are as follows (regarding 
the latter, see Kemeny and Snell 1960: 94): 
r = q(t,6)[2 ~(E) - 11 
P(S) = ~(E) 
The Sell-Freese derivative is a function of both E and 6, whereas 
P(S) is a strictly increasing function of E, having no dependenc~ 
on 6. To assess hypotheses about status-organizing processes, 
the latter provides a clear and compelling basis; the former 
depends upon temporal effects neither fully understood nor at 
issue. 
11The model does not adequately fit the entire set of 
fifteen conditions. If subtraits of Contrast Sensitivity are 
treated as separate specific status characteristics, following 
Hembroff (1982), we find X2 = 40.131, df = 13, P < .001. These 
are the results reported in Table 13. If Contrast Sensitivity is 
treated as a single specific status characteristic, 
operationalized by different numbers of tests in different 
experimental conditions (cf. Fisek et al. 1989), we find X'= 
52.235, df = 13, P < .0005. In both analyses, the discrepancies 
of fit are due to the inclusion of experimental conditions for 
which there are logical inconsistencies in the performance 
information given the subjects. Concerning these, the CR ~ 0.4 
criterion is certainly a rather lenient criterion; but the 
results presented in Table 14 show that the use of even this very 
lenient criterion greatly improves the fit of the BFNZ 
formulation. 
"Notably, the distinction between diffuse and specific 
status characteristics plays no part at all in the computation of 
an actor's expectation advantage (see the Appendix to this 
paper). Formally, all that matters is the lengths of the paths 
connecting the focal actor, the characteristics, and the task 
outcomes. The types of characteristics implicated in those paths 
are not important. It should be added, howevet·, that the 
distinction between diffuse and specific status characteristics 
does play an important part in certain extentions of the BFNZ 
formulation (see Ridgeway and Berger 1986; Ridgeway 1988). 
"In the BFNZ formulation, salience is a theoretical state, 
that is, a state that occurs under conditions specified by the 
theory. In general, it is not equivalent to a state of 
perception or awareness. Because the subjects in an experiment 
perceive a status characteristic does not automatically make that 
characteristic salient and thus a basis for their subsequent 
interaction. Indeed, one unobvious implication of the BFNZ 
formulation, which contradicts claims found in some of the 
'/') 
literature on ''experimenter effects'' (see, for instance, 
Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968), is that the subjects in an 
experiment do not necessarily incorporate cues from the 
experimenter into their behavior, even if the experimenter 
plainly seems to want them to. The results of Martin and Sell's 
study provide an excellent illustration of this point. 
14The theory of status validation has not been discussed in 
detail because it yields only ordinal predictions; and these do 
not, as far as I can determine, differ from the ordinal 
predictions of the BFNZ formulation for any of the situations 
that have been studied. 
The authors propose that when a specific and a diffuse 
status characteristic are salient in a situation, and when their 
evaluations provide consistent rank-orderings of the actors in 
that situation, the differences on the specific characteristic 
serve to validate the stereotypes associated with the diffuse 
characteristic. The behavioral predictions Knottnerus and 
Greenstein adduce from this reasoning are also predictions of the 
BFNZ theory; and, as the results presented in Table 6 show, the 
stronger metric predictions of the latter, as well as the shared 
ordinal predictions, are strongly supported by Knottnerus and 
Greenstein's experimental results. 
Knottnerus and Greenstein's theory raises a number of 
interesting questions about changes in expectations over a 
sequence of tasks. Such questions are extremely important for 
applications of the theory to the problem of reducing gender, 
racial, or age discrimination. A recent extettsion of the 
BFNZ formulation to sequences of tasks is described in Berger et 
al. (1989), Here, as in the applications dealt with in this 
paper, Knottnerus and Greenstein's work, while provocative, is 
superceded by the BFNZ formulation and its strctightforward 
extensions. 
REFERENCES 
Bales, Robert F. 1953. "The Equilibrium Problem in Small 
Groups" Pp. 111-161 in Working Papers in th_El __ The()r_y __ Qf_ Action, 
Talcott Parsons, Robert Freed Bales, and Edward Shils (eds. ). 
New York: Free Press. 
Benoit-Smullyan, E. 1944. "Status, Status Types, and 
Status Interrelationships." American Sociolo_gicat__Revie_w 9: 151-
61. 
Berger, Joseph. 1958. "Relations Between Performance, 
Rewards, and Action-Opportunities in Small Groups." Unpublished 
Ph.D. Dissertation. Department of Sociology. Harvard 
University. 
Berger, Joseph. 1988. "Directions in Expectation-States 
Research." Pp. 450-474 in Statu_~yeDeral._!~ation: _ N~w_'):'h_~_ori~s 
and Research, Murray Webster, Jr., and Martha Foschi (eds. ). 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen, and MatTis Zelditch, Jr. 
1966. "Status Characteristics and Expectation States." Pp. 29-
46 in Sociological Theories in Pro9r~ss, Vol. 1, Joseph Berger, 
Morris Zelditch, Jr., and Bo Anderson (eds.). Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin. 
Berger, Joseph, Bernard P. Cohen, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 
1972. ''Status Characteristics and Social Interaction.'' American 
80 
81 
Sociological Review 37: 241-255. 
Berger, Joseph, and Thomas L. Conner. 1969. "Performance 
Expectations and Behavior in Small Groups." ,'.c;t? __ !:;ociologica 12: 
186-197. 
Berger, Joseph, and M. Hamit Fisek. 1974. "A 
Generalization of the Theory of Status Characteristics and 
Expectation States." Pp. 163-205 in Ex12e<:;taj:_i_ot1_~t_aj:es Theory: A 
Theoretical Research Program, Joseph Berger, Thomas L. Conner, 
and M. Hamit Fisek (eds. ). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Winthrop. 
Berger, Joseph, M. Hamit Fisek, and Paul V. Crosbie. 1970. 
"Multi-Characteristic Status Situations and the Determination of 
Power-and-Prestige Orders." Technical Report Number 35. 
Laboratory for Social Research. Stanford University. 
Berger, Joseph, M. Hamit Fisek, Robert Z. Norman, and Morris 
Zeldi tch, Jr. 1977. Status Charact~ri stics ___ and Soci a:L_ 
Interaction: An Expectation-States _ _Ap_p_~:oacl:1. New Yot·k: 
Elsevier. 
Berger, Joseph, Murray Webster, Jr., _Cecilia L. Ridgeway, 
and Susan J. Rosenholtz. 1986. "Status Cues, Expectations, and 
Behaviors." Pp. 1-22 in Advance_!3 _ _i_!l_ __ (}_;:_q>,~p __ Pr_ocesses, Edward J. 
Lawler (ed. ). Greenwich, Connecticut: JAI Press. 
Berger, Joseph, Susan J. Rosenholtz, and Morris Zelditch, 
Jr. 1980. "Status Organizing Processes." Annual ___ RE>Y:iew of 
Sociology 6: 479-508. 
Berger, Joseph, David G. Wagner, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. 
1985. "Expectation-States Theory." Pp. 1-72 in Stiit_ll_~, Rewarc!!3_,__ 
82 
and Influence, Joseph Berger and Morris Zelditcl1, Jr. (eds. ). 
San Francisco: Jessey-Bass. 
Berger, Joseph, and Morris Zelditch, Jr. (eds. ). 
Forthcoming. Sociological Theories in l'_J;:.Qg!'e~;s, Vol. 3. Los 
Angeles: Sage. 
Cohen, Elizabeth G., and Susan S. Roper. 1972. 
"Modification of Interracial Interaction Disability: An 
Application of Status Characteristics Theory." American 
- ----- -- .. --·--~~ 
Sociological Review 37: 643-657. 
Fisek, M. Hamit, Robert Z. Norman, and MaK Nelson-Kilger. 
1989. "Status Characteristics and Expectation-States Theory: A 
Priori Model Parameters and a Test." Working Paper 1989-5. 
Center for Sociological Research. Stanford University. 
Fox, John, and James C. Moore, Jr. 1979. "Status 
Characteristics and Expectation States: Fitting and Testing a 
Recent Model." Social Pyschology__Q',!A!:.!:.E'!J::JY 4/.: 126-34. 
Freese, Lee. 1974. "Conditions for Status Inequality in 
Informal Task Groups." Sociomet!:}' 37: 174-188. 
Freese, Lee. 1976. ''The Generalization of Specific 
Performance Expectations." Sociometry 39: 194-200. 
Freese, Lee, and Bernard P. Cohen. 1973. "Eliminating 
Status Generalization.'' Sociometry 36: 177-193. 
Geschwender, James A. 1967. "Continuities in Theories of 
Status Consistency and Cognitive Dissonance." ~()c:;i_a], __ Fo_rces 46: 
160-71. 
Greenstein, Theodore N., and J. David Knottnerus. 1980. 
83 
"The Effect of Differential Evaluations on Status 
Generalization." Social Psychology_Quar~~ili 43: 147-154. 
Hembroff, Larry Alan. 1978. "Inconsistent Performance 
Information and the Elimination of Status Generalization." 
Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation. Department of Sociology. 
Washington State University. 
Hembroff, Larry A. 1982. "Resolving Status Inconsistency: 
An Expectation-States Theory and Test." Social__f_Cl_r<:;~E. 61: 183-
205. 
Hembroff, Larry A., Michael W. Martin, and Jane Sell. 1981. 
"Total Performance Inconsistency and Status Generalization: An 
Expectation-States Formulation." Sociologicaj_Qu_aJ::t;eili 22: 421-
430. 
Hughes, Everett C. 1945. "Dilemmas and Contradictions of 
Status." American Journal of Sociqlogy 50: 353-59. 
Kemeny, John G., and J. Laurie Snell. 1960. Finite Markov 
Chains. Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand. 
Knottnerus, J. David, and Theodore N. Greenstein. 1981. 
''Status and Performance Characteristics in Social Interaction: A 
Theory of Status Validation." Sg_g_:i,al_j's_y_g]1()_l()gy QUaJ:_t:.,LlY 44: 
338-349. 
Lenski, Gerhard. 1954. "Status Crystalization: A Non-
Vertical Dimension of Social Status." bl!!"'__r_i_c:;_an. Sos;iolg_gi_cal 
Review 19: 405-13. 
McCullagh, Peter, and John A. Nelder. 1983. Generalized 
Linear Models. London: Chapman and Hall. 
Martin, Michael W., and Jane Sell. 1980. "The Marginal 
Utility of Information: Its Effect Upon Decision-Making." 
Sociological Quarterly 21: 233-244. 
Martin, Michael W., and Jane Sell. 1985. "The Effect of 
Equating Status Characteristics on the Generalization Process." 
Social Psychology Quarterly 48: 178-182. 
Morrison, Donald F. 1976. Multivariate._Statistical Methods 
(Second Edition). New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Rainwater, Julie, Max Nelson-Kilger, and Jacqueline Cashen. 
1988. "Developing an Open Interaction Experimental Situation." 
Pp. 413-429 in Status Generalization: NE!.\'L __ 'l'he_()ry anci _I<e._s_e._,.rcl}, 
Murray Webster, Jr., and Martha Foschi (eds. ). Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 1987. "Nonverbal Behavior, Dominance, 
and the Basis of Status in Task Groups." blll!"rican S_oci,:>],.Qgica_l 
Review 52: 683-694. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L. 1988. ''Gender Differences in Task 
Groups: A Status and Legitimacy Account." Pp. 188-206 in 9tatu~ 
Generalization: New Theory and Re:;;ea_fch, Murray Webster, Jr., and 
Martha Foschi (eds.). Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and Joseph Berger. 1986. 
"Expectations, Legitimation, and Dominance Behavior in Task 
Groups." American Sociological Review 51: 603-617. 
Ridgeway, Cecilia L., and David Deikema. 1989. "Dominance 
and Collective Hierarchy Formation in Male and Female Task 
Groups.'' American Sociological Review 54: 79-93. 
85 
Rosenthal, Robert, and Lenore Jacobson. 1968. J:y_gmalion in 
the Classroom. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. 
Sell, Jane, and Lee Freese. 1977. "Aspects of the Decision 
Process for Halo Phenomena." Paper presented at the annual 
meetings of the American Sociological Association. 
Sell, Jane, and Lee Freese. 1984. "The Process of 
Eliminating Status Generalization." Social For~~~ 63: 538-554. 
Skvoretz, John. 1981. "Extending Expectation-States 
Theory: Comparative Status Models of Participation in N-Person 
Groups.'' Social Forces 59: 752-770. 
Wagner, David G., and Joseph Berger. 1985. "Do Sociolog-
ical Theories Grow?" American Journal of Socio],(:>_gy 90: 697-728. 
Wagner, David G., and Rebecca S. Ford. 1983. "Confirming 
and Disconfirming Performance Expectations.'' Paper presented at 
the West Coast Conference on Small Groups Research, San Jose, 
California (April 1983). 
Weber, Max. 1947 [originally 1922]. 'I11_e Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization. Translated by A. M. Henderson and 
Talcott Parsons. New York: The Free Press. 
Webster, Murray, Jr. 1977. "Equating Characteristics and 
Social Interaction: Two Experiments." Socig]lletry 40: 41-50. 
Webster, Murray, Jr., and James E. Driskell, Jr. 1978. 
"Status Generalization: A Review and Some New Data." American 
Sociological Review 43: 220-236. 
Webster, Murray, Jr., and Martha Foschi (eds. ). 1988. 
Status Generalization: New Theo_rY_and R_E!_e_~arc;_]1. Stanford: 
86 
Stanford University Press. 
Zelditch, Morris, Jr., and Bo Anderson. 1966. "On the 
Balance of a Set of Ranks." In Sociol.Qgjs_<!_L_Theories_:j,!} 
Progress, Vol. 1, edited by Joseph Berger, Morris Zelditch, Jr., 
and Bo Anderson. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin. 
Zelditch, Morris, Jr., Patrick Lauderdale, and Steven 
Stublarec. 1980. "How Are Inconsistencies Between Status and 
Ability Resolved?" Social Forces 58: 1025-43. 
